The new Greenland Agreement has, unsurprisingly, drawn conflicting assessments as the public and experts have asked who “won”, especially after the topic was blown out of all proportions with hysteria over unlikely invasion scenarios.

From the very beginning of Trump’s pressure over Greenland, one camp has insisted there was “nothing to fight over”, because the 1951 agreement between the United States and Denmark already gave Washington “everything it wanted.”

Even after the new deal, some continue to argue that the United States obtained nothing more than what the 1951 agreement already provided. That reading is fanciful; first because the United States has secured several important new guarantees, and second because the 1951 agreement, though never fully superseded, was no longer in force in anything approaching its original form. It has been repeatedly tweaked and revised in the past, most notably in 1991 and 2004 and, in the process, substantially diluted.

The 1951 rules on the presence of US forces in Greenland, for example, were already displaced in 1955 by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Far more significant were the major revisions introduced by the Joint Agreement signed at Igaliku on 6 August 2004. Without delving into the minute detail, the biggest change of all appears in the opening line of Article 1: the reduction of Greenland’s “defense areas” to the single base at Thule — today’s Pituffik.

Anyone who talks about the 1951 treaty as if the United States still enjoyed automatic rights over all the many defense areas that existed at the time is simply bending reality to fit a narrative. That has not been the case for many years. And indeed, the new treaty of 22 September 2026 does NOT automatically restore all the defense areas that existed in 1951. One can tell oneself that they would have been restored had Washington specifically requested them; but there is no actual evidence of that.

Under the new treaty, the United States secures the expansion of Pituffik and two new defense areas to develop: Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig. The first was once an US air base (closed however in 1958); the second is not a real base today. It is a semi-prepared runway for cargo aircraft and a tiny Danish outpost with a permanent presence of about three soldiers at a time. Nearby there is a molybdenum mining site.

Let us in any case compare the new arrangements with those of the much-invoked 1951 treaty. There are still substantial improvements for the US.

First of all, the new agreement is of unlimited duration and can be amended “only by mutual consent.” The 1951 treaty provided for automatic termination if NATO were dissolved. An unlikely event, to be sure, but the difference is still significant, above all because the new agreement is also signed by Greenland’s local government and protects the United States in the event of Greenland’s future independence from the Kingdom of Denmark. Any new independent Greenland state would be required to remain in NATO, completing the accession process as a new member if necessary, and would also be bound to assume “all the rights and obligations” now resting with the Kingdom of Denmark under the treaty. Given that independence sentiment in Greenland is real, that is no small thing.

In 1951, the opening of any new defense areas was subject to mutual agreement between governments and to NATO planning. Under the new agreement, a request for new areas no longer has to answer to NATO planning, but only to the needs of securing “the American continent.” In practice, a US request is now accepted by default in principle; consultations among the governments follow in order to settle “the details of implementation.” It falls to the United States to put forward a proposal specifying location, size, purpose, and mode of use, after which the parties will “immediately” convene consultations to decide on implementation and details. If no agreement is reached through the Permanent Committee within 90 days, negotiations escalate to the deputy-ministerial and then ministerial level.

For the construction of new unmanned remote sites outside the “defense areas,” an “accelerated” government approval process is provided. To protect the security of installations, the United States has the right to raise objections to the construction or change of use of any building near a base, triggering automatic discussions to work out a solution.

US military and government assets are granted free movement to and from the defense areas. Overflight, landing, and access to territorial waters are always permitted, subject only to any limitations jointly defined. This increases US discretion relative to Article V(3) of the 1951 treaty, which specified that access and movement between defense areas were subject to rules agreed and promulgated by the Danish authorities in Greenland. The new treaty also explicitly provides for underwater access to territorial waters: the door is fully open to submarine operations.

Given even just the location of the defense areas — Pituffik, which is to be expanded, at the far northwest; Narsarsuaq at the southern tip; and Mestersvig on the Atlantic coast to the east — the United States in effect has assured freedom of movement across the entire territory.

And then, of course, there is the section on investment in the country. Any nation that is not a NATO member, a NATO partner, or a European Union country will not be allowed to have “control,” “significant influence,” or “access to non-public information” without prior agreement among the parties.

Together with the commitment to manage counterintelligence jointly, this cements strong US control over the strategic region and over future investment in its natural resources. Trump will not, of course, celebrate the formal annexation of Greenland as a new state. What he does secure for the United States is firm control over the region, new bases, and a codified method for requesting further ones in the future.

Greenland is perfectly positioned to serve as a protective bastion for the United States in an anti-ballistic role, and among the first new developments will indeed be those linked to the Golden Dome missile shield. Also clearly at stake, however, is control of the Arctic, and with the new positions in Greenland, the new icebreakers so strongly desired by Trump take on an entirely different weight. Finally, the mining dimension could in time prove of great importance as well.

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