The decisive Democratic victory in the midterm elections, with the takeover of the Senate and the House of Representatives, raises significant questions about the possible international consequences, especially for the Gulf crisis.

The nature and configuration of the American institutional system help clarify this. The President retains all his prerogatives: he is Commander in Chief, can continue to issue executive orders within the limits set by law, and can use the veto on laws passed by Congress. A veto can be overridden only if the law is re-approved by a two-thirds majority in both chambers. The President also directs foreign and security policy.

Trump has already sent some signals. A message on the White House website reads “Trump is still your President,” while on Truth Social, Trump himself posted an image of a MAGA cap with the word “VETO.” War Powers resolutions can be vetoed or ignored, while the only direct lever available to Congress remains the military budget. That lever must be handled with extreme caution, given the weight of military-industrial lobbies and their influence over individual lawmakers and interest groups. Moreover, the new Congress will not take office until January.

One aspect, however, deserves reflection: how Tehran perceives the situation. The indirect negotiation is stalled. A draft agreement prepared by the usual Qatari mediators has been under discussion for more than a week, but the 2 sides continue to pass the ball back and forth. The United States wants verifiable limits on enrichment and guarantees on uranium stockpiles. Tehran first wants the lifting of sanctions, an end to the naval blockade, and the release of frozen funds.

A President perceived as a “lame duck” could convince the IRGC and the regime’s hardliners that time is on their side. In this logic, it would be enough to hold out, count on Congress and American public opinion, and push the price of a deal even higher. But this is precisely where the calculation could backfire on Iran. A hardening of Tehran’s position would damage Trump’s image, whose personality is rather mercurial, but above all it would further call into question the credibility of American coercive leverage. On this point, not even the Democrats can allow Tehran to misread US resolve, or allow Iran to keep the Strait of Hormuz and the entire Gulf under threat. Appearing as the backer on which Iran counts to win concessions would also be a political cost to avoid.

Thus, everything comes down to the thin line between perceptions and their manipulation: Trump is weakened and probably less predictable, and Tehran must not pull the rope too hard, because it risks snapping.

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