ASELSAN unveiled a containerised air and surface defence package at Euronaval 2026. Presented in the wake of Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the Turkish solution offers tankers and other commercial vessels an embarked combination of guns, missiles, sensors and fire-control equipment, removable once the dangerous passage is over.
Its significance extends beyond protecting individual hulls, as the concept of operations (CONOPS) envisages equipping a small proportion of merchant traffic, yet sufficient to complicate an attacker’s calculations. Indeed, a seemingly vulnerable vessel might deliver a muscular defensive response. The concept shifts some uncertainty from the defender to the aggressor, although its deterrent effect would depend on how convincingly that capability could be deployed and sustained.
A combat system delivered in containers
ASELSAN’s approach combines deployable versions of the GOKDENIZ close-in weapon system and GOKSUR vertical-launch point-defence missile system. Rather than permanently integrating weapons into a ship’s structure and combat-management architecture, the company packages them with the services needed for independent operation. GOKDENIZ incorporates its own power supply and operator environment, while GOKSUR comprises separate launcher and fire-control containers, with dedicated sensors and generators.
The exhibition model illustrates the arrangement aboard a merchant hull named KUZEYIN INCISI. Container-shaped modules occupy positions along the hatch covers, while a separate gun mounting stands on the forecastle. The intention is to distribute a self-defence capability across available deck space without converting the vessel into a purpose-built combatant. According to an ASELSAN representative, the combined arrangement requires at least four containers, covering GOKDENIZ, the GOKSUR launcher, missile fire control and power supply. Each missile-launcher container accommodates 12 vertically launched weapons.
GOKSUR provides the outer defensive layer, while GOKDENIZ supplies the gun-based close-in layer. Together, they offer successive engagement opportunities against aerial threats, rather than leaving the ship dependent on a single interception attempt. This remains point defence, however, not the surveillance reach, magazine depth or layered protection of a modern escort.
Making the attacker hesitate
The most interesting operational proposition is selective deployment. A navy or government-backed protection organisation could embark trained detachments and containerised systems on selected ships before a high-risk transit, then recover the equipment afterwards. ASELSAN explicitly envisages removing and redeploying its systems between vessels and other critical assets.
Under such a concept, the attacker could no longer confidently assume that every merchant hull was defenceless. A drone or missile raid might encounter active interception rather than an exclusively passive response. The intended deterrent is defensive uncertainty, not an undisclosed ability to strike launch sites ashore.
That uncertainty has some limits as exposed sensors, emissions, weapon deployment and observable embarkation activity could identify protected ships. Naturally, a handful of armed merchants do not create a protective umbrella over an entire shipping lane. Their immediate contribution would be local survival and a more difficult targeting problem for the attacker.
Several possible employment scenarios follow. For instance, a tanker could embark a package for a passage through the Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, relinquishing it at an agreed destination. A strategically important cargo ship could receive temporary protection when an escort was unavailable. Alternatively, a naval auxiliary could use the same architecture to strengthen self-defence without awaiting a lengthy refit.
Installation would still demand engineering scrutiny of deck strength, securing arrangements, sensor sightlines and safe firing arcs assessment. On tankers, ammunition, missile exhaust and gunfire would also have to be reconciled with hazardous cargo operations.
The regulatory bottleneck
For some navies, the harder integration problem may be institutional. Embarking military weapons and personnel aboard a civilian vessel raises questions of authority, responsibility and jurisdiction that existing procedures may not readily resolve. IMO guidance already recognises that state-appointed vessel-protection detachments involve complex legal issues and potentially require flag-, coastal- and port-state permissions.
Who authorises an engagement, and how does that authority interact with the master’s responsibility for the ship? Where can missiles and ammunition be embarked, retained or landed? Anti-piracy arrangements provide experience, but they cannot be stretched to a blanket authorisation to deploy naval air-defence systems. Therefore, applicable national rules remain decisive.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the commercial proposition has nevertheless progressed beyond an exhibition model. According to an ASELSAN representative, a foreign navy has signed a contract for the containerised air-defence system, with deliveries expected in 2027. The customer and configuration remain undisclosed, but ASELSAN says its concept already has a launch customer.



