Eleven months ago, on 7 October 2023, the day of the attack perpetrated by Hamas against the territory of the Jewish State, started the tragic invasion of the Gaza Strip and turned a large part of the Fertile Crescent into a veritable powder keg. Despite the fact that the intensity of the clashes on the other fronts of the conflict has certainly been on a smaller scale than that recorded during the land operations in the Strip, hostilities across the border with Lebanon and those with the rival Islamic Republic of Iran have, on several occasions, threatened to expand and trigger serious escalations; the last time, just a month ago.

On 30 July alone, Tel Aviv raised the stakes on both fronts, once again putting into practice its strategy of ‘targeted killings’, now well established. In practice, this strategy has seen, all these months long, the Israeli forces eliminate, through precision raids, several of the highest ranking officials of the Party of God, Hamas and the Pasdaran not only in Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi territory, but also in Iranian territory. Israel first conducted an air strike on Haret Hreik - one of the neighbourhoods in the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital and a historical stronghold of the Party of God - during which Faud Shukr, considered the most important military leader of Hezbollah and the right-hand man of Hassan Nasrallah himself, was eliminated. Subsequently another targeted killing eliminated the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran - in circumstances that are still unclear.

Over the past month, therefore, nothing but Iran's response to the operation has been awaited. In fact, as repeatedly stressed by Ayatollah Khamenei himself, following the raid on the Iranian embassy in Damascus on April 1, 2024, "whenever Iranian territory was directly attacked, Tehran would not hesitate to respond". That ‘provocation’ was far inferior to the killing of a Hamas leader in the capital on the day of the inauguration of the new President Masoud Pezeshkian. Yet, the Iranian retaliation has not been triggered, but the Party of God, on 24 August, conducted an attack using an unspecified number of rockets (estimated at between 200 and 300, according to sources on both sides), as well as some 20 kamikaze drones against 11 different IDF sites based in northern Israel, including the military compound located on Mount Meron, which has been in the crosshairs of Hezbollah attacks since the beginning of hostilities.

According to IDF statements, however, most of the weapon systems were intercepted by Israeli air defences, or fell before they reached their various targets. In reality, it would appear that Hezbollah's attack was supposed to be even bigger: although the dynamics are still unclear at the moment, the Israelis reportedly conducted a series of pre-emptive strikes in South Lebanon about 30 minutes before the planned start of the Party of God's attack. The Israeli Air Force, through the use of (approximately) 100 fighter jets, reportedly struck some 40 different locations and destroyed rocket launchers and other unspecified platforms, in order to reduce the imminent ability of the Lebanese militia to attack. In fact, according to some estimates (coming from circles close to the IDF), Hezbollah had planned to launch more than 500-600 rockets (plus dozens and dozens of suicide drones), against the 200-300 actually fired. In any case, Hezbollah's retaliation and the IDF attacks in south Lebanon in recent weeks (which continue, however, on a daily basis) do not seem to have - at least, for the moment - triggered that escalation spiral between the two sides, which has been expected since at least the beginning of the summer as consequence of the continued Israeli precision raid strategy and the increasingly harsh reactions of its opponents.

Despite the risk of a widening of the conflict, the scenario of a full-scale war has been avoided so far, and this because both sides lack the material capabilities to open a new front. For its part, Hezbollah, despite the huge arsenal of rockets with which it is equipped - used in a circumscribed manner over the last few months - is perfectly aware of the risks of an open conflict with Israel, as well as of the unpopularity of this scenario among Lebanese society and public opinion, worried about the worsening of the political-financial crisis that has already afflicted the country for several years.

Israel, on the other hand, is certainly not immune to the consequences of a war that has been engaging, for a year now, significant military resources on various fronts and that is slowly wearing down the Israeli economy. Notwithstanding the fact that last spring Israel declared the withdrawal of almost all its units present in the centre and south of the Gaza Strip - after having withdrawn, in early 2024, from the northern sector - the activities of the Hamas militia and other Palestinian groups have never been completely ‘extinguished’ and have forced Tel Aviv to ‘return’ and intervene several times in different districts of the Strip through targeted operations.

Over the past two months, in particular, the IDF intervened again in both Gaza City and Rafah. In the former, after ordering the population to evacuate (10 July), for a week, forces of the 99th Reserve Division carried out several operations to clear various Hamas buildings and weapons depots.

During the following weeks, the city was also the target of several air strikes (3-4-10 August). As far as the Rafah sector is concerned, instead, the Israeli forces - including the 84th GIVATI Infantry Brigade and the 401st Armoured Brigade (162nd Division) - carried out, from the beginning of May until the end of June, intense combing operations, repeating the pattern of the activities carried out in the northern, central and south-central sectors of the Strip in the past months.

As Hamas activities in the Rafah area gradually decreased, the IDF decreased the intensity of its operations in the area, which only briefly resumed between 13 and 23 August, during which time the 162nd Division conducted several round-up operations in Tal as Sultan, the northeastern neighbourhood of Rafah.

During this phase, the IDF progressively consolidated its positions along the Philadelphia Corridor. The control of this strip of land, which divides the Gaza Strip from Egypt, represents a fundamental strategic interest for Tel Aviv, which has the objective of extinguishing any attempt by Hamas, in the future, to rebuild itself: in fact, from here - in particular, through the dense network of tunnels underneath - the Palestinian militiamen have imported, over the years, huge quantities of arms, equipment and components. For this reason, clearance operations of the tunnels have already begun: on 21 August, the Israeli Minister of Defence, Yoav Gallant, stated that the forces of the 162nd Division and the units of the Engineer Corps had discovered and destroyed about 150 tunnels connecting the Gaza Strip to Egypt.

Furthermore, from satellite images released on 26 August, it would appear that the IDF has begun to pave the road along the corridor for about 300-400m eastwards, starting from the so-called Swedish Corridor (village of Al Qarya as Suwaydiya). The formation of ‘remnants’ and the regeneration of Hamas activities in all those areas given, over time, for reclamation, forces the IDF, however, to keep part of its forces active and ready to intervene inside the Gaza Strip, thus not allowing them to free up resources for possible operations on the border with Lebanon, should they be necessary.

This problem has become even more acute over the past week due to the intensification of Israel's activities on the other front, West Bank. Since last 27 August, in fact, the IDF has launched a large-scale ‘anti-terrorist’ operation in West Bank, with the aim of weakening and eliminating the network of Palestinian militias present in the occupied territories. The Israeli forces, in particular, conducted several ‘cleansing’ operations in the cities of Nablus, Qabatiya, Silat al-Harithiya and carried out some raids in the refugee camps of Al Fara and, above all, Jenin. In the latter, where the operation is most intense, the IDF announced just this morning that it had eliminated, since 27 August, 14 gunmen, arrested 30 individuals suspected of being affiliated with Hamas, and dismantled about 30 IEDs placed under the streets of the town.

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