The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Israel and its allies intercepted the ‘majority’ of the Iranian ballistic missiles (75-80%, according to rumours). The Israeli military indicated that only a small number of impacts were recorded in the central and southern regions of Israel. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan described the Iranian attack as "defeated and ineffective".

As we reported, the Iranian attack, announced by US intelligence sources 2 hours earlier, saw the launching of a mix of 180/200 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM, including QADR-F/H, DEZFUL, KHEYBAR SHEKAN 1/2, and maybe the near-hypersonic FATAH) against the territory of the Jewish State. The operation was christened TRUE PROMISE 2.

To Jerusalem, the defence of its territory against ballistic threats must be achieved through a complex political-military strategy, of which missile defence is a key aspect, but not the only one.

The first layer of Israel's defence is represented by proactive strategic measures such as the political, economic and, if necessary, military interdiction of the adversary's ability to field a concrete ballistic threat against Israeli territory. This explains certain strong foreign policy positions (Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Sudan, etc.) and pre-emptive air raids on various targets in the Middle East and Africa.

The second, tactical, consists of the military ability to react to a missile attack through two different 'tool sets': air counter-interdiction, which reduces the threat as much as possible (e.g. early September strikes on Lebanon), and multil-layered missile defence.

Lastly, the third layer is represented by the passive resistance to attacks, with specially equipped shelters and the preparation of specific operational plans to protect the population.

Israel considers its Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) system as part of its strategic forces. A multilayered defence system against all type of ballistic missile threats is in place based on different elements.

Withing the second layer, the HOMA (Wall) is a nationwide ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) network based on the on the ARROW-2, ARROW-3, and DAVID’S SLING systems and related sensors, augmented by additional Israeli strategic early warning capabilities. HOMA also includes 10 IRON DOME (land-based) and 5 C-DOME (naval version) batteries against unguided rockets and short-range missiles, that were not employed during last night missile attack.

Three IAI ARROW-2 batteries are operational at Palmachim (near Tel Aviv) and Ein Shemer (near Hadera) and address primarily MRBM threats. The follow-on IAI ARROW-3 system, developed in the framework of a cooperation program with the United States (IAI and Boeing), achieved the initial operational capability (IOC) in January 2017 and it is tweaked for LRBMs. At least one battery is deployed, but some sources report that up to 3 batteries might be active. Development activities are underway on a further announced system known as ARROW-4, reportedly designed to counter gliding hypersonic vehicles (see also here). The first 2 ARROW-2 batteries employ the ELM-2080 GREEN PINE L-band multimode solid state AESA radar credited with 500 km range, while the subsequent batteries of ARROW-2 and ARROW-3 are equipped with the improved ELM-2080S SUPER GREEN PINE, credited with 800-900 km range. Each ELM-2080/ELM-2080S can track dozens of targets travelling at high speed.

In addition, to have a more complete overview of incoming threats and avoid being saturated, early warning capabilities are ensured by at least one IAI ELTA TERRA dual-band early warning system, a sophisticated AESA radar solution based on GaN technology and designed for long-range detection and tracking of various aerial threats. It combines the ELM-2090U ULTRA UHF radar for long-range detection and the ELM-2090S SPECTRA S-band radar for high-resolution tracking. This advanced system boasts very long-range and large volume search capabilities, allowing it to accurately track multiple target types, including ballistic missiles, satellites, and air-breathing vehicles such as stealth aircraft. In its most complete, 22-modules version, ULTRA is credited of engagements well beyond 500km, while SPECTRA has possibly comparable to or exceeding the 500 km range of the UHF component (no official figures available). One of the key features of the TERRA system is its advanced threat analysis capabilities, which provide accurate predictions of impact points for incoming threats and can estimate the launch points of ballistic missiles. Its ability to classify different object types, including low Radar Cross-Section (RCS) targets, further enhances its effectiveness in confronting evolving ballistic missile technologies that are increasingly capable, with longer ranges and higher speeds. To sum up, TERRA can calculate and anticipate the trajectory of large numbers of ballistic missiles (and other high-speed flying objects with a smaller than 0.1m2 RCS) and determine which ones may impact populated areas or sensitive targets. Consequently, GREEN PINE and SUPER GREEN PINE radars focus only on threats that have a high probability of hitting targets, thus avoiding being overwhelmed and launching missiles only against truly dangerous incoming threats.

Since 2017, Israeli early warning capability is augmented by the permanent presence of a US detachment (known as Site 883 Life Support Area) operating a Raytheon RTX AN/TPY-2 radar. At least part of the US detachment is based near the Mashabei Sadeh kibbutz, while the actual location of the radar is unknown. Some sources report it at the Dimona radio facility, others at the Ramon Air Base, still others at the Nevatim Air Base or even at a fixed Israeli intelligence post on Mount Keren. More likely, the system does not have a single location and moves periodically precisely so as not to give any reference points. The AN/TPY-2 is a mobile X-band radar with very high resolution and long range. The system comprises a large rectangular antenna with a surface area of over 9 m2(containing over 25,000 modules), a command centre, power generators, a technical support module and several logistics containers. Everything is built to operate in extreme weather conditions, including the desertic environment.

The TPY-2 can operate in two modes: 'forward-based mode', in surveillance and early warning function at a regional level, and 'terminal mode', i.e., subservient to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system, to intercept ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of re-entry into the atmosphere. The AN/TPY-2 present in the Negev is used in forward-based mode, a configuration that allows the acquisition, tracking, discrimination, classification, identification and calculation of the trajectory of ballistic threats of all kinds (SRBM, MRBM, IRBM and LRBM) from the launch phase. In this mode, the radar's range would exceed 5,000 km compared to 'only' 1,000 km when used in 'terminal mode'. The large range would allow the US to detect the launch of a ballistic missile 6-7 minutes before the Israeli GREEN PINE/SUPER GREEN PINE radars, doubling their warning time. Thus, Israeli batteries would have 11-13 minutes to react instead of 5-6. It is not a case that the latest updates of the ARROW-2 include the optimization of SUPER GREEN PINE radars to operate with TPY-2s, SPY-1D, and SPY-6 radars.

Back to the TPY-2, information management remains under US control, as the sensor is one of the nodes of the US BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense), integrated through the Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). It is likely that the 2 conspicuous fixed antennas installed southwest of the Negev Nuclear Research Center serve precisely to ensure (or facilitate) the direct and continuous connection between the TPY-2 and the US. In the event of a launch, like last night, it would be the US chain of command that would promptly warn Israel of the incoming threat, further enhancing the already impressive responsiveness of the ARROW-2/3 and DAVID’S SLING batteries. In this way, the US ensures the direct and complete flow of information, while Israel can be sure that the US is involved from the earliest stages of a military confrontation of this level.

For shorter range engagements, the RTX/Rafael DAVID’S SLING interceptor system was formally declared operational in 2017. At least 2 batteries are in service, and sufficient to cover the whole Israeli territory, and a third battery is likely to have been procured for redundancy. DAVID’S SLING is specifically designed to intercept a wide range of aerial threats, including medium to long-range rockets, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and drones. It effectively engages threats at ranges between 40 to 300 km, depending on the specific configuration and type of target, including those travelling at Mach 8/9. The system’s main sensor is IAI's MMR (Multi-Mission Radar), specifically the ELM-2084 model, featuring advanced S-band 4D full AESA, GaN technology powered radar. The MMR is capable of detecting and handling up to 1,000 targets and has a maximum instrumental range of 470 km. Up to 16 targets can be engaged simultaneously via the command and control centre. The system employs the STUNNER interceptor missile, which is a two-stage, hit-to-kill weapon capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 7.5 and intercepting targets at altitudes of up to 15 km. Its multi-mission capability allows it to engage a broad spectrum of aerial threats, including the latest generation of tactical ballistic missiles such as the Russian ISKANDER and Iranian FATEH-110 rockets.

DAVID’S SLING integrates seamlessly into Israel's HOMA multi-layered missile defence architecture. This integration provides operational advantages by enabling the interception of threats at high altitudes, thereby minimizing collateral damage from debris.

Last night, ARROW-2/3 and DAVID’S SLING were sided by the US Navy’s guided-missile destroyers USS Cole and USS Bulkeley which were operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. According to Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, US DDGs fired at least 12 “anti-missile munitions” (not specified, probably Raytheon SM-3, like it was the case in April).

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