Approximately 24 hours after Tehran's attack on Israel, an initial assessment can be made of how the raid was carried out and what impact it had on targets, based on the elements that have emerged so far.
The attack started from 9 different missile sites located in the areas of Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz, Khorramabad, Arak, Najafabad, Karaj and Kermanshah and was carried out in 2 waves that included between 180 and 200 medium to intermediate range ballistic missiles, including DEZFUL, EMAD, QADR-2F/H, KHEYBAR-SHEKAN-1/2 and FATTAH, although the exact identification between KS-2 and FATTAH-1 is extremely difficult, given their almost identical design and shared booster.
The launch sites and the order of magnitude of the attack are identical or almost identical to last April's raid. Again, most of the launchers used were 'old' systems approaching the end of their service life, such as EMADs or QADR-1s, which are basically SHAHAB-3s produced in the late 1990s and early 2000s and upgraded with improved guidance systems and new re-entry vehicles.
Compared to the April attack, however, there was a greater use of the latest and most 'valuable' systems, such as the QADR-2F/H (photo), equipped with new MaRVs (re-entry vehicles based on multiple independent warheads capable of changing their path at altitude, each equipped with a new terminal phase guidance system), KHEIBAR-SHEKAN and the hypersonic FATTAH, albeit flanked by a few dozen EMADs and QADR-1s, which were basically used as decoys to saturate Israeli defences. Exactly like last April, the Iranian targets were either military or infrastructural in nature. For instance, at least a couple of missiles hit a gas platform in the Mediterranean Sea, off Ashkelon.
As far as military infrastructure is concerned, the 2 airbases of Tel Nof - home to 2 squadrons of F-15C/D BAZ fighters, a CH-53 helicopter department and a maintenance unit - and Nevatim, home to 3 squadrons of F-35I ADIR fighter-bombers, as many squadrons of KC-707 and C-130 tanker/transport aircraft, and a detachment of G-550 aircraft, were certainly hit. According to official IDF sources, no aircraft were damaged in the attack - also because the bulk of the aircraft had probably been pre-emptively scrambled, or redeployed to secondary bases - nor were any ammunition depots or critical infrastructure damaged.
All missile impacts on Israeli airbases were described as 'ineffective', meaning that no damage was caused to Air Force operations, which actually continued today. However true this may be, is well-established Israeli practice to minimise the damage caused by enemy attacks. In fact, video analysis clearly shows 15 and 12 impacts between Nevatim and Tel Nof respectively, with accompanying secondary explosions. Therefore, it is very likely that some areas of the aforementioned bases (car parks, hangars, taxiways, maintenance areas, offices) were hit, as well as some air defence systems (radars and/or launchers) in other areas of the Jewish country.
In addition, at least two missiles fell a few metres from some of the buildings used by the Mossad, in particular the Ramat Hasharon headquarters of the 8200 SIGINT Unit, located in the Gillot area (Tel Aviv suburbs). Israeli vehicles deployed at the border with Lebanon and on the Gaza Strip have been targeted as well. From the videos circulating on the net, it is evident that many of the Iranian missiles were not intercepted by Israeli and allied defences.
This, however, does not necessarily imply that each of these missiles hit a sensitive target. Since this was a saturation attack, the HOMA anti-ballistic missile network (which includes sensors from the ARROW 2/3 and DAVID'S SLING) selected which missiles to shoot down (i.e.: those aimed at high strategic value targets), even at the cost of sacrificing factories, farms and even some energy infrastructures or semi-populated centres.
With respect to the aforementioned total of 180/200 missiles, net of the 15/20 destroyed in the launch phase or finished off course (Jordan, Syria and Iran itself), about 170 have reached Israel, which claims to have shot down 75/80% of them, a figure that should also include interceptions carried out by allied assets. These included 2 of the 3 ARLEIGH BURKE-class destroyers - COLE and BULKELEY - in the Eastern Mediterranean that have launched 12 SM-3 missiles, and the US and Jordanian PATRIOT PAC-2/3 systems (the Jordanian ones activated only for missiles that entered or were directed towards its national airspace). Should figures be confirmed, it means that between 35 and 40 Iranian missiles were not intercepted and at least half of them reached their targets.
As Netanyahu announced, the Israeli response will be tough. The most probable response is expected to be the elimination of the fixed and mobile missile sites (should adequate IMINT be available) from which the attacks originated. These are not easy targets, as in many cases they consist of underground positions, air defence systems (radars including early warning, and launchers) and energy infrastructures. Actions aimed at disabling/degrading Iranian nuclear capabilities under development at the Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz sites are unlikely, unless Israel wants to further escalate. Perhaps in preparation of an air and missile incursion, on the night between 30 September to 1 October, the Israeli Air Force carried out a series of attacks against 4 radar and missile positions located in eastern Syria (Izra and Sanamayn, located east of Daraa, and west of Suwayda, Thaalah and Tell Kharouf).