In early 2025, Ukraine announced a major restructuring of its Ground Forces, shifting from Tactical and Operational Groups toward the creation of Army Corps. Among the most notable consequences of this shift is the potential dissolution of traditional Armored Brigades—once considered a core pillar of Ukrainian conventional land power.

Currently, Ukraine maintains three Armored Brigades—the 1st, 3rd, and 4th—each composed of three tank battalions. However, these units have rarely operated as cohesive formations, and armored elements are also dispersed across other branches such as the Marines, Air Assault Forces, National Guard, and Territorial Defense. The evolving nature of the battlefield is rendering such concentrated armored formations increasingly obsolete.

Constant surveillance by Russian drones, combined with the threat posed by kamikaze UAVs and long-range anti-tank systems, has dramatically altered the role of tanks in the field. No longer able to engage in massed maneuvers or breakthrough operations, Ukrainian tanks have been forced into a more cautious role—often acting as mobile artillery from positions several kilometers behind the front. Even Western-supplied tanks have proven vulnerable to long-range precision munitions such as the LMUR missiles launched by Russian Ka-52 helicopters. Hiding armor in barns or garages and deploying them briefly before retreating has become standard practice, but even this tactic is becoming less effective as enemy drones improve their capacity to detect and strike concealed assets.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine appears to be adopting a new approach: reducing the number of tanks concentrated in armored brigades and instead creating autonomous tank battalions that can be modularly attached to infantry or mechanized units. This model allows greater flexibility and responsiveness on the battlefield. It has already been partially implemented: in late 2024, the 17th and 5th Armored Brigades were transformed into Heavy Mechanized Brigades, halving their tank strength but doubling their infantry fighting vehicles. The surplus tanks were redistributed to create new independent battalions, such as the 29th and the previously established 12th.

The structure of a tank battalion with approximately 30 main battle tanks has long been a consistent feature of Ukraine’s mechanized brigades—most notably in the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which initially fielded such a unit before reductions caused by combat losses. Today, however, the focus is shifting toward expanding this model.

This restructuring reflects both operational necessity and logistical constraints. Ukraine faces persistent difficulties in maintaining and repairing tanks, especially given the variety of foreign models in service and the slow pace of new deliveries. By adopting smaller, more flexible armored units, Kiev is optimizing the use of its limited resources while adapting to the tactical realities imposed by drone-centric warfare.

Rather than signaling the end of the tank’s relevance, this transformation points toward a new concept of armored warfare—one integrated with electronic warfare, drones, and ISR assets, and aimed at exploiting tactical openings rather than forcing decisive breakthroughs through mass. The Ukrainian experience may ultimately serve as a preview of how modern armies will rethink their use of armored forces in the 21st century.

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